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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PROPRIETY OF ESTABLISHING ON VoIR DIR= JuROR's CONNECTION
WITH INSURANCE COMPANY*
In the recent case of Smithers v. Henriquez,l which was an
action commenced to recover damages for injuries sustained in
an automobile accident, the counsel for plaintiff, over objection
of defendant's attorney, filed an affidavit alleging that the suit
was defended by the American Employers' Insurance Company
and was represented by its counsel. A single question to be asked
of the jurors was submitted to the court, and over the defendant's
objection the plaintiff's request to ask the question was granted.
All this took place in the judge's chambers and out of the pres-
ence of the jurors. Twelve jurors were then called in, and plain-
tiff's counsel asked them collectively thd following question:
"'Are you, Mr. Long [one of the jurors], or any of you
gentlemen, interested financially, either as stockholders or other-
wise in the American Employers' Insurance Company?' "
The repeated objection of the defendant was again overruled.
No response was made to this question by any of the jurors.
Motion was then made to discharge the panel, and that motion
was likewise denied. The Appellate Court2 having affirmed a
judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $7,500, the defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court. The defendant contended that
the evidenee was so close that the question of the plaintiff pro-
pounded to the jurors on their voir dire examination acquainted
the jurors with the fact that an insurance company was inter-
ested in the case and was prejudicial to his cause. It was also
suggested that the purpose of the inquiry was a clever subterfuge
to let the jury know that an insurance company was defending
the case. The Supreme Court held the question to be proper and
affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court.
This case is of unusual interest as it is the first time that this
question has been properly raised in the courts of this state.
In the Illinois case of Mithen v. Jeffery,s a prospective juror
testified that his business was "all kinds of insurance, including
liability insurance." The following questions and answers en-
* The writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the attorneys for
both the plaintiff and the defendant in drafting this comment
1 368 Ill. 588, 15 N. E. (2d) 499 (1938). Followed in Bellchambers v.
Ebeling, 294 Ill. App. 247, 13 N. E. (2d) 804 (1938) and Landess v. Mahler,
295 I11. App. 498, 15 N. E. (2d) 13 (1938).
2 287 I11. App. 95, 4 N. E. (2d) 793 (1936).
a 259 Ill. 372, 102 N. E. 778 (1913).
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sued: "Do you know Mr. Jackson?" -"No." "Mr. Snow
here?"--"No." "The Travelers' Insurance Company?" Upon
objection the court held this question to be improper as it did not
indicate whether the juror was connected in any way, financially
or otherwise, with the Travelers' Insurance Company so that a
challenge for cause would be proper. Furthermore from the
record in the case, there was nothing to show that the insurance
company, as a matter of fact, was an insurer of defendant. In
addition, there was nothing to show that the question was asked
in good faith, and according to at least one authority 4 this is an
essential prequisite. In the case of Kenny v. Marquette Cement
Manufacturing Company,5 the following question was asked cer-
tain jurymen, "Are you acquainted with any of the officers or
agents of the Aetna Insurance Company?" Here again the court
held the question improper because there was nothing to indicate
that the insurance company was the insurer of the defendant.
In the case of McCarthy v. Spring Valley Coal Company,6 the
plaintiff's counsel, in cross-examining a witness in regard to the
taking of a written statement, asked whether Mr. Bayne, the
attorney of the Aetna Insurance Company, was present. On ob-
jection the question was withdrawn, and counsel said that he had
meant Mr. Bayne, attorney for the Spring Valley Coal Company.
Commenting on the propriety of that question, the court said,
"The question and the circumstances were well adapted to inti-
mate strongly to the jury that the appellant was insured against
liability for accidents of this character, and that the party which
would have to respond for any judgment which might be ren-
dered was the Aetna Insurance Company. Evidence of this
character was not competent. The intimation may not have been
true, and it is unfortunate that the suggestion should have
been inadvertently made. The only effect it could have would
be to convey an improper impression to the jury."
On the other hand, in the case of Iroquois Furnace Company
4 Viou v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn. 97, 108 N. W. 891
(1906); Chybowski v. Bucyrus Co., 127 Wis. 332, 106 N. W. 833 (1906).
5 243 Ill. 396, 90 N. E. 724, 727 (1909).
6 232 Ill. 473, 83 N. E. 957, 960 (1908). In the case of Aetitus v. Spring
Valley Coal Co., 246 Ill. 32, 92 N. E. 579, 580 (1910), attorney for defendant
in error inquired of two of the jurors on their voir dire examination if they
were interested in any casualty company which insured employers of labor
against damages for injuries to employees. The court sustained an objection
to that course of examination apparently on the grounds that the questions
were not asked for the purpose of exercising the right of peremptory chal-
lenge of said jurors and hence were not asked in good faith.
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v. McCrea,7 counsel for plaintiff in the trial court asked the jury,
"Anybody acquainted with Mr. Hertig, who represents the in-
surance company, I believe the Union Casualty Company of
St. Louis?" Upon objection of counsel for defendant, the court
asked whether the question was asked in good faith. Upon an
affirmative reply the question was allowed. As to the propriety
of this interrogation the Supreme Court stated: "The question
was proper at least for the purpose of enabling counsel to exer-
cise their right of peremptory challenge, if for no other purpose."
The rule of the latter case was followed by the Illinois
Appellate Court in the case of Frochter v. Arenholz,8 where the
court stated:
"Counsel for the respective plaintiffs in error complain that
prejudicial error arose out of the conduct of counsel for defend-
ant in error in the examination of a juror, and also in the exami-
nation of a witness. It is claimed that this led the jury to believe
there was an insurance company interested in the defense of
the case. The questions asked the juror and his answers showed
that he was employed by an insurance company and that one of
counsel for George Arenholz represented the same company.
There is nothing in the examination of the juror to indicate that
the questions were asked for any other purpose than to enable
counsel to exercise his right of challenge."
The court in the instant case, depending largely upon the
McCrea decision, decided that there are three situations in which
the interest of an insurance company not a party to the suit
might be disclosed to the jury: " (1) Where the relation is
shown by the questions and answers during the course of the
trial after the jury is selected; (2) where the voir dire shows a
purpose to improperly inform the jury of the relation; and
(3) where the information develops on the voir dire through
questions propounded in good faith with the object of eliminat-
ing interested parties from the jury." 9 In the first situation,
the questions and answers are irrelevant. The questions under
the second group are not only improper but unethical.' 0 The
questions under the third group, however, are permissible and
it is within this category that the instant case falls.
The above distinctions are similar to those recognized by other
authorities. One such authority," considering the propriety of
7 191 Il. -340, 61 N. E. 79, 81 (1901).
8 242 Ill. App. 93 (1926).
9 Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N. E. (2d) 499 (1938).
10 Canon 15, Canons of Legal Ethics, American Bar Association.
11 56 A. L. R. 1418.
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asking such questions of witnesses during the course of a trial
and after the jury has been selected, stated:
"Against no one thing do the courts, in the trial of personal-
injury or death cases, guard more zealously than the introduction
of, or attempts to introduce, the fact that the defendant carries
liability insurance protecting him from the consequences of his
own negligence. Jurors as a class are thought to be prej-
udiced against insurance companies; and consequently, if they
are told in effect that an insurance company, rather than the
individual defendant of record, must bear the final loss conse-
quent upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, they will be less
inclined to consider the merits of the case, and more inclined to
return a verdict for the plaintiff, because of an unfair prejudice
against the insurer .... It may be said to be the universal rule
that . . . evidence that the defendant in a personal-injury or
death action carries liability insurance, protecting him from
liability to third persons on account of his own negligence, is not
admissible."
However, as to asking the jurors on the voir dire as to their
interest in, or connection with, an insurance company under
these circumstances, this authority goes on to say:"
"The overwhelming majority of the courts sustain the right of
counsel for the plaintiff in a personal-injury case, so long as he
acts in good faith for the purpose of ascertaining the qualifica-
tions of the jurors, and not for the purpose of informing them
that an insurance company is back of the defendant of record,
to interrogate prospective jurors by one form or another of
questions, with respect to their interest in, or connection with,
indemnity insurance companies. It has been held error to deny
plaintiff's counsel the right to qualify the jurors in this respect,
even though the insurer, on the motion for a new trial, offers
an affidavit that none of the jurors are related to or connected
with it. "12
A similar differentiation was laid down by the Federal court
in the case of New Aetna Portlacnd Cement Company v. Hatt's
when it said:
"A manifest distinction arises concerning the pertinency of
the questions when testing the qualifications of proposed jurors
and when determining the admissibility of evidence under dis-
tinct issues during the trial. The weight of authority favors the
allowance of such questions and the answers, where the questions
12 56 A. L. R. 1456.
Is 231 F. 611, 618 (1916).
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appear to be ... in good faith and for the purpose only of ascer-
taining the fitness of persons summoned as jurors .... On the
other hand, there is a distinct class of decisions forbidding such
questions, as well as the answers, while the cause is in course of
trial; the theory of these decisions is that, since there are no
issues to which the questions and answers can have any relevancy,
the real object of the questions is to suggest to the jury that the
defendant is protected against loss by an indemnitor. . . . The
fact is too well understood to require more than a mere state-
ment that in cases where the right of trial by jury exists litigants
are entitled to have their cause tried before an impartial jury;
and perhaps the most effective means of securing this end is
through an intelligent and legitimate exercise of the right of
challenge, both peremptory and for cause."
Reviewing the decisions of the other states we find that only
Nebraska supports the defendant. In the case of Bergendahl v.
Rabeler14 the court said, "The pernicious, unethical purpose for
which an unrestricted right to such an interrogation on voir dire
may be used is such that restriction is necessary to an attain-
ment of a proper consideration of issues in actions tried to
juries. To deny such a right entirely would work far less perver-
sion of proper verdicts than does its unrestricted use." On the
other hand we find no less than thirty states definitely holding
that questions asked in voir dire similar to that in the instant
case are proper. 15 The courts of the remaining states apparently
have not passed on this question.
14 131 Neb. 538, 268 N. W. 459, 461 (1936).
15 Alabama:
Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Lee, 182 Ala. 561, 62 So. 199(1913) ; Jones v. Pritchett, 232 Ala. 611, 169 So. 224 (1936).
Arkansas:
Cooper v. Kelley, 131 Ark. 6, 198 S. W. 94 (1917) ; Halbrook v.
Williams, 185 Ark. 885, 50 S. W. (2d) 243 (1932).
California:
Maggert v. Bell, 116 Cal. App. 306, 2 P. (2d) 516 (1931) ; Smith v.
Sabin, 137 Cal. App. 567, 31 P. (2d) 230 (1934).
Colorado:
Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P. (2d) 740 (1935) ; Potts v. Bird,
93 Colo. 547, 27 P. (2d) 745 (1933).
Connecticut:
Girard v. Grosvenordale Co., 82 Conn. 271, 73 A. 747 (1909).
Florida:
Ryan v. Noble, 95 Fla. 830, 116 So. 766 (1928).
Georgia:
Bibbs Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 36 Ga. App. 605, 137 S. E. 636 (1927);
Cobb v. Atlantic C. Co., 46 Ga. App. 633, 168 S. E. 126 (1933).
Idaho:
Bressan v. Herrick, 35 Ida. 217, 205 P. 555 (1922) ; Faris v. Bur-
roughs Adding Mach. Co., 48 Ida. 310, 282 P. 72 (1929).
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Looking at the merits of the case without regard to judicial
decisions, we find the weight of logic heavily in support of the
decision reached in the majority rule. The basic common-law
rule underlying the right to trial by jury is the principle that
the plaintiff shall be entitled to a jury free from prejudice. To
take a cross-section of the citizenry represented on the average
jury there must, of necessity, be a certain percentage of people
who would not make fair jurors in personal injury cases where
an insurance company is interested in the defense. In many
communities, prospective jurors are members of local and mutual
Indiana:
Goff v. Kokomo Brass Works, 43 Ind. App. 642, 88 N. E. 312 (1909);
Inland Steel Co. v. Gillespie, 181 Ind. 633, 104 N. E. 76 (1914).
Iowa:
Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 239 N. W. 36 (1931); Bauer v.
Reavell, 219 Iowa 1212, 260 N. W. 39 (1935). The attitude of these
various state courts is possibly best stated in the Iowa case of Foley
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 119 Iowa 246, 93 N. W. 284 (1903), where
the court stated: "It is common knowledge that many companies and
corporations have been formed in this country for the purpose of,
and are engaged in, the business of insuring employers of labor
against damages growing out of personal injuries sustained by
employes. Of necessity, such business is carried on by agents, and so
it is that in most cities and towns one or more of such agents can be
found. It is easy to understand that the interests of such companies
lie on the defensive side of cases such as the one at bar. And if the
defendant happen to be insured in some one or more of such com-
panies, the interest becomes a direct and active one. That a defendant
in an action of this character may be insured in some such company
is immaterial of itself. But it is manifest that a plaintiff may not
desire to have the jury which is to try his case made up, in whole or
in part, of the agents or employes of such an insurance company. The
fact of such employment would not constitute a ground of challenge
for cause, but, as parties and their counsel cannot be expected to know
personally every juror who may be called into the box, an examina-
tion sufficiently broad should be permitted to enable a party to
determine upon his peremptory challenges."
Kansas:
Billings v. Aldridge, 133 Kan. 769, 3 P. (2d) 639 (1931) ; Swift &
Co. v. Platte, 68 Kan. 10, 74 P. 635 (1903).
Kentucky:
Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1, 81 S. W. (2d) 869 (1935) ; Dow Wire
Works Co. v. Morgan, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 854 (1906).
Massachusetts:
Compulsory insurance provided by statute so that every case is an
insured case.
Michigan:
Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 187, 236 N. W. 222 (1931); Van
Dyke v. Knoll, 262 Mich. 644, 247 N. W. 768 (1933).
Minnesota:
Seitz v. Clybourne, 181 Minn. 4, 231 N. W. 714 (1930) ; Spoonick v.
Backus-Brooks Co., 89 Minn. 354, 94 N. W. 1079 (1903).
Mississippi:
Yazoo City v. Loggins, 145 Miss. 793, 110 So. 833 (1926).
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insurance companies. In the city of Chicago, for example, there
is one organization with a membership of almost 100,000 persons
many of whom are policy holders, and it is not unlikely that the
normal jury panel in Chicago would contain one or more mem-
bers of this club. Surely such interested parties might be loath to
grant a large award to a plaintiff where such verdict would
result in their being called upon to make a personal contribution
to help pay the award (as in the case of the mutual companies)
or would result in a smaller annual dividend or rebate to them.
Likewise, there are innumerable agents, employees, adjusters,
and others working for insurance companies. Both they and
Missouri:
Decker v. Liberty, 39 S. W. (2d) 546 (1931) ; Jones v. Missouri
Freight Transit Corp., 225 Mo. App. 1076, 40 S. W. (2d) 465 (1931).
Montana:
Beeler v. Butte & London Copper Development Co., 41 Mont. 465,
110 P. 528 (1910).
Nevada:
Nordyke v. Pastrell, S4 Nev. 98, 7 P. (2d) 598 (1932).
New Jersey:
Bashaw v. Eichenberger, 100 N. J. L. 153, 125 A. 130 (1924).
New York:
Odell v. Genesee Const. Co., 129 N. Y. S. 122 (1911) ; Dulberger v.
Gimbel Bros., 134 N. Y. S. 574 (1912); Cahill's New York Civil
Practice Act (1937), 452.
North Carolina:
Fulcher v. Pine Lumber Co., 191 N. C. 408, 132 S. E. 9 (1926);
Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S. E. 169 (1928).
Ohio:
Salerno v. Oppman, 52 Ohio App. 416, 3 N. E. (2d) 801 (1936);
Morrow v. Hume, 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N. E. (2d) 39 (1936).
Oklahoma:
Beasley v. Bond, 173 Okla. 355, 48 P. (2d) 299 (1935) ; Kennedy v.
Raby, 174 Okla. 332, 50 P. (2d) 716 (1935).
South Carolina:
Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S. C. 129, 166 S. E. 101 (1932).
South Dakota:
Morton v. Holscher, 60 S. D. 50, 243 N. W. 89 (1932) ; Simmons v.
Leighton, 60 S. D. 524, 244 N. W. 883 (1932).
Texas:
D. & H. Truck Line v. Lavallee, 7 S. W. (2d) 661 (1928).
Utah :
Balle v. Smith, 81 'Utah 179, 17 P. (2d) 224 (1932).
Washington:
Child v. Hill, 149 Wash. 468, 271 P. 266 (1928) ; Heath v. Stephens,
144 Wash. 440, 258 P. 321 (1927).
Wisconsin:
Heinzcn v. Nuprienok, 208 Wis. 512, 243 N. W. 448 (1932) ; Martell
v. Kutcher, 195 Wis. 19, 216 N. W. 522 (1927).
Wyoming:
Eagen v. O'Malley, 45 Wyo. 505, 21 P. (2d) 821 (1933).
United States:
Eppinger & Russell Co. v. Sheely, 24 F. (2d) 153 (1928) ; Cleveland
Nehi Bottling Co. v. Schenk, 56 F. (2d) 941 (1932).
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their immediate relatives would be prejudiced in favor of de-
fendant's cause.
In more sparsely settled communities the lawyers are fre-
quently acquainted with the jurors and know whether or not
they are interested, directly or indirectly, in the insurance com-
pany involved. In large cities like Chicago, however, such can-
not be the case. In Cook County the counsel in civil cases has
little opportunity to investigate the prospective jurors. Even if he
did have access to the jury list, it would be impossible to check
into the interests and connections of each, in order to determine
whether or not he might have prejudicial interests. The right
of the plaintiff to an impartial jury should certainly set off the
problematical injury to the defendant that might be caused by
conveying to the minds of the jury that an insurance company
is defending the case. An Ohio court 6 in discussing this feature
indicated that we still have the right to rely on the assumption
that twelve men picked from the average community will "sit
together, consult, apply their separate experience to the affairs of
life to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion."
A question might arise as to why the insurance company should
be mentioned at all. If the jury does not know about the com-
pany's connection, should there be any prejudice either way?
The answer is that during the examination of witnesses this in-
formation does creep out. Another answer seems to be that very
little harm is done by such interrogations on voir dire becauseSscm- to be quit well lu ood b e public at large that
the people who can afford to pay a judgment are the ones who
are insured and it is very rare that suit is brought against a
defendant who is not in some manner covered by insurance. But
even if damage is done to the insurance company which is neither
the plaintiff nor the defendant of record, that fact should not
outweigh the right of the plaintiff to an impartial jury. Then,
too, why all this worry about the insurance company? In
Massachusetts there is compulsory insurance, while in Wisconsin
the insurance company is a proper defendant."' In the normal
case the insurance company often makes the investigations, takes
the written statements of the witnesses, and provides the at-
torneys for the defense. After all, the company is the real de-
fendant, for it must pay the ultimate judgment, while the
16 Paullonis v. Valentine, 120 Ohio St. 154, 165 N. E. 730 (1929), citing
Sioux City & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 657, 21 L. Ed.
745 (1874), and Davidson Steamship Co. v. United States, 205 U. S. 187, 27
S. Ct. 480, 51 L. Ed. 764 (1907).
17 Wis. Stats. 1931, § 85.93.
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defendant of record is merely a nominal defendant. No irrepa-
rable injury would seem to result by protecting the plaintiff from
a prejudicial jury even though the jury is supplied, indirectly
and in good faith, with the knowledge that the defendant is in-
sured. We need but review the actions brought in death cases
to see how rarely is the maximum statutory judgment rendered
by the jury. It appears that juries still decide the cases largely
upon the merits rather than upon the question of whether or not
the defendant is covered by insurance.
It was suggested in the dissenting opinion in the instant case
and by others 8 that the information of the interest of the
jurors could be ascertained in an indirect method. It is thought
that this could be accomplished by asking the juror about his
financial affairs, his occupation, his relatives, and their occupa-
tions, and if it were found that he had a financial interest in any
corporation, he should be compelled to name such corporation.
Similar questions might be asked to ascertain whether he was a
member of a mutudl insurance company. The objection to such
a procedure is that, in addition to taking a great deal of time,
it would take no great amount of intelligence for the prospective
juror to infer from the nature of the questions that an insurance
company was connected with the case. Furthermore, such prying
into the juror's personal affairs would naturally cause him to
become annoyed. As a result the juror would have such a hostile
attitude toward the plaintiff's cause as to nullify all the efforts
expended towards securing a fair jury. It has also been sug-
gested by another Ohio case1 9 that the judge could conduct the
examination of the jurors on this point and instruct the jurors
that they must assume that the defendant is not insured. It is
highly probable, however, that such an instruction would have
little or no effect upon the subconscious prejudice which the
jury might feel against an insurance company, and the defend-
ant might logically argue this point. The best answer to the
defendant's contention would be that, since the legislature of
the state of Illinois has seen fit to give to parties litigant the
right to challenge in order to enable them to select a jury of
men who will serve without prejudice or partiality,2 0 the courts
should be reluctant to restrict such right merely for fear of
18 Mithen v. Jeffery, 259 Ill. 372, 102 N. E. 778 (1913); Bergendahl v.
Rabeler, 131 Neb. 538, 268 N. W. 459 (1936) ; Holnan v. Cole, 242 Mich.
402, 218 N. W. 795, 797 (1928).
19 Vega v. Evans, 128 Ohio St. 535, 191 N. E. 757 (1934).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 78, § 14 and Ch. 110, § 190.
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remote injury to an insurance company which has voluntarily
injected itself, for reasons of profit, into the case.
The final test in Illinois as to whether questions may be asked
of jurors on voir dire which involve their connections with an
interested insurance company is good faith. This good faith may
be exercised in two ways. The plaintiff may file an affidavit
alleging that he has been reliably informed that an insurance
company is defending the suit, or the counsel for the plaintiff
may allege that that question is asked in good faith. In either
case the questions must be asked for the purpose of permitting
the counsel for the plaintiff to exercise his right of challenge.
G. KLoEK
